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INTRODUCTION
When John Roberts became Chief Justice of the United States more
than a decade ago, commenters frequently described him as a
minimalist. 1 Although Chief Justice Roberts himself resisted this label,2
he fairly inspired it by advocating for more consensus among his
colleagues 3 and by famously recounting to a Georgetown Law
Commencement audience his view that “[i]f it is not necessary to decide
Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Minimalist, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2006, at B11.
2 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 158 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (statement of Judge John G. Roberts) (“Like
most people, I resist the labels.”).
3 See id. at 303 (“I do think it should be a priority to have an opinion of the Court.”).
†

1
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more to dispose of a case . . . it is necessary not to decide more.”4 The
suggestion that the Court decide significant issues one case at a time
recalls the work of Cass Sunstein, the American academy’s most
articulate minimalist. 5
For many of Chief Justice Roberts’s detractors, describing him as a
minimalist seems Orwellian. In case after case during his tenure, the
Chief Justice has written or joined opinions in which a sharply divided
Court dramatically changed the law, often displacing considered
legislative judgments in the process. In Citizens United v. FEC, 6 the
Court invalidated corporate political campaign expenditure limits. 7 In
Shelby County v. Holder, 8 the Court neutralized section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. 9 In National Federation of Independent Businesses v.
Sebelius (NFIB), 10 the Court held that Congress did not have the
Commerce Clause power to force Americans to purchase health
insurance, 11 and that Congress could not condition existing Medicaid
funding on states expanding the scope of their Medicaid plans. 12
This Article argues that both contentions are correct. Chief Justice
Roberts is both a minimalist and a maximalist. Reconciling this
apparent tension requires an understanding of the different ways in
which one can practice minimalism. As Sunstein has explained in detail,
and as Part I elaborates, minimalism is typically understood as decisionmaking that is both “narrow” rather than “wide” and “shallow” rather
than “deep.” 13 A minimalist prefers that courts decide one case at a
time—that is, narrowly—without necessarily resolving similar cases that
may share a close factual nexus. 14 A minimalist also prefers that courts
justify decisions through rationales that are incompletely theorized—
that is, shallow—and that preserve the possibility of consensus. 15 For
4 Chief Justice Roberts, Commencement Address at Georgetown University Law Center
(May 21, 2006) [hereinafter Georgetown Address] (video available at https://www.c-span.org/
video/?192685-1/georgetown-university-law-center-commencement-address). Chief Justice
Roberts was repeating a line he had used in a concurring opinion while a judge on the D.C.
Circuit. PDK Labs. Inc. v. U.S. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.,
concurring) (referring to “the cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to
decide more, it is necessary not to decide more”).
5 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999).
6 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
7 See id. at 365.
8 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
9 See id. at 2631.
10 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
11 See id. at 2591 (Roberts, C.J.).
12 See id. at 2606–07.
13 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 10–13.
14 See id. at 10.
15 See id. at 11.
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Sunstein, this dual commitment to narrow and shallow rulings defines a
jurist as a minimalist in the tradition of the Whig political theorist
Edmund Burke. 16
Burkeanism is not, however, the sole variety of minimalism.
Alexander Bickel exemplifies a different tradition. Bickel believed that it
was indispensable for Supreme Court Justices to decide cases according
to principle, since their relative capacity to do so is what distinguishes
them from politicians. 17 In order to create the conditions under which
deciding according to principle is a practical possibility, however, the
Court had to have substantial control over its docket. 18 Bickel argued
that the Court should avoid hearing cases, even on unprincipled grounds,
unless it was prepared to decide the merits in principled fashion. In the
words of Gerald Gunther’s well-known takedown, Bickel advocated
“100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time.” 19
In Sunstein’s terms, Bickel’s version of minimalism is narrow
rather than broad—it supports one-case-at-a-time adjudication and
advocates techniques for not deciding any more than is needed—but it
is deep rather than shallow—it supports thorough rather than
incomplete theorization. Part II argues that Chief Justice Roberts is a
minimalist in this tradition. He feels temperamentally and
institutionally constrained not to reach out to decide cases, but his
merits decisions are typically ambitious and generative: he is what this
Article calls maximinimalist.
Part II focuses on three principal cases as examples of Chief Justice
Roberts’s approach: Shelby County, Citizens United, and NFIB. These
are three of the most significant and most controversial constitutional
cases of Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure. In each case, the Supreme Court
invalidated or altered the terms of a congressional statute, the most
solemn—and on some accounts, least minimalist—act the Court can
perform. 20 At the same time, in two of the cases—Shelby County and
Citizens United—the Court’s decision followed earlier cases in which the
Court could have but declined to declare the very same laws
unconstitutional. In the third case, NFIB, the Court declined to
invalidate the statute in its entirety because, as Part II argues, the
doctrinal groundwork to declare the Affordable Care Act to be beyond
See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006).
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 69 (2d ed. 1986).
18 See id. at 70–71.
19 Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964).
20 See Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring) (per
curiam) (“[T]o declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional . . . is the gravest and most delicate
duty that this Court is called on to perform.”).
16
17
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Congress’s taxing power had not yet been laid. In each case, the Roberts
Court proceeded narrowly but decided deeply, just as Bickel had urged.
Part III offers a qualified defense of maximinimalism. This
decision-making posture is costly. A commitment to narrow rulings
almost by definition tolerates a significant lack of clarity in the law,
which is antithetical to the role of an apex court whose most important
modern task is to give guidance to lower courts, public officials, and
citizens. And on the Roberts Court in its first decade, deciding cases
deeply has given the law a conservative valence that might be misaligned
with the ideology of the median voter. 21
The virtues of maximinimalism—particularly in closely contested
constitutional cases—are nonetheless significant. A narrow posture
towards momentous constitutional cases respects the capacity of other
constitutional actors to engage in less juriscentric and more dialogic
forms of constitutional construction. At the same time, a commitment
to depth on the merits provides transparency about the Court’s
ideological valence. As Bickel recognized, transparency in substantive
decision-making is the Court’s only form of accountability and,
ultimately, the source of its lawmaking authority.
I. ONE CONCEPTION OF MINIMALISM
Minimalism carries a diverse, and at times competing, set of
definitions, and some clarity about the term will frame this Article’s
contribution. Sunstein’s work provides the foundation for the Article’s
claims. On this understanding, a judge who is minimalist simpliciter
decides cases both “narrowly” and “shallowly.”
A narrow decision addresses only the case before the court even if
other, hypothetical cases may be implicated. 22 In seeking to elucidate the
difference between a narrow and a wide decision, it is useful to compare
the Court’s two most significant abortion rights rulings. In Roe v.
Wade, 23 the Court issued a set of directives that outlined the kinds of
abortion restrictions a state may enact in each of the three trimesters of
pregnancy. 24 For example, the Court suggested that a state may require
that a first-trimester abortion be performed by a physician but may not
require that it be performed in a hospital. 25 Roe is a wide rather than
21 See Nate Silver, Supreme Court May Be Most Conservative in Modern History,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 29, 2012, 8:06 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/supremecourt-may-be-most-conservative-in-modern-history.
22 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 10.
23 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24 See id. at 163–65.
25 See id. at 163.

GREENE.38.2.8 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

12/14/2016 12:55 PM

M A X I M I N I M A LI S M

627

narrow opinion because it addresses a broad range of factual scenarios
rather than simply deciding whether and why the particular abortion
restrictions in Texas and in Georgia (whose statute gave rise to Roe’s
companion case, Doe v. Bolton) were unconstitutional. 26 In Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 27 the Court jettisoned
Roe’s trimester framework in favor of an “undue burden” standard. 28
The Court applied this standard to the Pennsylvania statute before it,
but it declined to discuss in any detail how the standard might apply to
other possible abortion restrictions. The decision in Casey was narrow
rather than wide. 29 As a shorthand, constitutional decisions that are
articulated in terms of general rules of decision tend to be wide, whereas
those that apply constitutional standards to particular fact situations
tend to be narrow.
This discussion understands narrowness as a feature of substantive
doctrine, but narrowness can also apply to pre-decisional law. Since
1988, the Supreme Court’s docket has been almost entirely
discretionary. 30 The Court as a body therefore has near complete power
to refuse to address a particular issue. Even after it decides to hear a
case, the Court has the power to exercise what Bickel referred to as the
passive virtues, the “mediating techniques of ‘not doing.’” 31 Examples
include holding that a litigant lacks standing, that the case is moot or
unripe, that the issue presents a political question, or that a lower court
opinion should be vacated for reconsideration in light of a set of
announced principles rather than reversed. Bickel was drawing on the
canonical discussion of these and similar techniques of constitutional
merits avoidance in Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority. 32 There, Justice Brandeis referred to “a
series of rules under which [the Court] has avoided passing upon a large
part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.” 33
Brandeis was urging the Court to prefer narrow rather than wide
approaches to its constitutional docket.
A shallow decision is one that “avoid[s] issues of basic principle” by
relying on what Sunstein has referred to as incompletely theorized
26 410 U.S. 179 (1973); see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 922 (1973) (“The opinion strikes the reader initially as a sort of
guidebook, addressing questions not before the Court and drawing lines with an apparent
precision one generally associates with a commissioner’s regulations.”).
27 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
28 Id. at 876–77.
29 See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 362–63.
30 Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012)).
31 BICKEL, supra note 17, at 112.
32 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
33 Id. at 346 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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agreements. 34 An incompletely theorized agreement involves either a
consensus on particular conclusions without agreeing on the basis for
those conclusions or consensus as to a conceptual apparatus without
agreeing on what follows from it. 35 Shallow decision-making enables a
court to reach a judgment amid sharp division over the basis for the
decision. For example, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (Fisher
I), the Court issued a 7-1 judgment vacating and remanding the Fifth
Circuit’s decision upholding the race-based affirmative action plan of
the University of Texas at Austin. 36 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
asserted that the lower court applied strict scrutiny incorrectly. 37 It was
clear at the time, and is crystal clear now, that the members of the
majority disagreed as to whether the University of Texas’s plan could
satisfy strict scrutiny properly applied. 38 A deep decision would have
exposed these disagreements. A shallow one left them dormant.
When commentators refer to a judge, a court, or a decision as
“minimalist,” they sometimes mean that the decision was deferential to
political decision-makers. This form of minimalism is associated with
James Bradley Thayer, who believed courts should interfere with
congressional constitutional judgments only in instances in which
Congress has “not merely made a mistake, but [has] made a very clear
one,” 39 and with Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote, dissenting, in
Lochner v. New York, 40 that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be
read “to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion” unless the
statute under review was irrational. 41
This understanding of minimalism is not this Article’s subject and
is at best orthogonal to it. Political deference can be accomplished
through wide rather than narrow adjudication, as when the Court
announced in United States v. Carolene Products Co. 42 that most social
and economic legislation would enjoy a strong presumption of
constitutionality. 43 Deference can also be accomplished deeply rather
than shallowly, as when Justice Stone sketched in his famous Carolene

See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 11.
See id.
36 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
37 See id. at 2415.
38 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
39 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893).
40 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
41 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
43 See id. at 152.
34
35
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Products footnote a theory that seemed to justify deference in terms of
democratic political conditions. 44
Minimalism of the Thayerian sort is interesting and important, but
Chief Justice Roberts has not committed himself to systematic political
deference beyond the ordinary traditions of the Court. He has, on the
other hand, committed himself to a form of minimalism evocative of
narrow and shallow decision-making. Part II details those
commitments, and their relationship to his practices as a judge, below.
II. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S MAXIMINIMALISM
Chief Justice Roberts came to the Court espousing what on
Sunstein’s terms would be called a shallow approach to judging, one that
seeks to achieve consensus and does not rely upon general theories to
justify case outcomes. This Part shows that the Chief Justice’s tenure has
been marked by narrowness but not by shallowness.
A.

What Chief Justice Roberts Has Preached

Chief Justice Roberts’s most extended public discussion of his
interpretive philosophy was at his confirmation hearing. Senator Orrin
Hatch asked Roberts, who was then a D.C. Circuit judge, to place
himself within a category of “an originalist, a strict constructionist, a
fundamentalist, a perfectionist, a majoritarian or a minimalist.” 45 Judge
Roberts replied that he “resist[ed] the labels” but “prefer[red] to be
known as a modest judge,” one with “humility” who recognizes the
“limited” role of a judge, to have respect for precedent, and to be
“collegial” with his colleagues on the bench. 46 When Senator Hatch
followed up by asking whether it was fair to call him “eclectic,” Judge
Roberts answered: “I do not have an overarching judicial philosophy
that I bring to every case . . . . I tend to look at the cases from the bottom
up rather than the top down. And like I think all good judges focus a lot
on the facts.” 47
It is difficult to make firm pronouncements based on this kind of
answer. The testimony a judicial nominee offers at a hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee is intended above all to secure his
See id. at 152 n.4. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
REVIEW (1980) (developing a process-oriented theory of judicial review grounded
in the categories that Carolene Products excluded from the presumption of constitutionality).
45 Roberts Hearing, supra note 2, at 158.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 159.
44

OF JUDICIAL
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confirmation. While not necessarily false or misleading, such statements
are often—to return to Sunstein’s parlance—incompletely theorized.
They are stated at a level of abstraction that enables supportive Senators
to hear what they want, while at the same time frustrating opposing
Senators looking for an opening to exploit.
Still, two features of Roberts’s response to Senator Hatch sketch the
outlines of a judicial philosophy of a sort. First, Judge Roberts wanted to
convey a sense of collegiality, of not being a flamethrower but of seeking
dialogue and rapprochement with colleagues with whom he might not
initially agree. Roberts indeed expressed a quite specific commitment to
seeking a more unified Court that featured fewer separate opinions or
splintered judgments. “[T]he Chief Justice has a particular obligation to
try to achieve consensus consistent with everyone’s individual oath to
uphold the Constitution, and that would certainly be a priority for me if
I were confirmed,” he said at his hearing. 48 “The Supreme Court speaks
only as a Court. Individually, the Justices have no authority. And I do
think it should be a priority to have an opinion of the Court.” 49
Prioritizing collegiality and a single opinion of the Court necessarily
requires a judge to seek incompletely theorized agreement; that is, it
requires him to be shallow.
Chief Justice Roberts also disclaimed any overarching judicial
philosophy and emphasized a “bottom up” approach that focuses on the
facts of an individual case. This commitment is almost precisely the
opposite of the one Justice Scalia articulated in an early speech and
subsequent Article entitled The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules. 50 A
jurisprudence that seeks to adjudicate via case-by-case application of
standards rather than through general rules is appropriately described as
shallow rather than deep. Prioritizing the individual case enables a
consensus outcome that assumes away difficult questions of first
principle, as when, for example, a court resolves cases on harmless error
or qualified immunity grounds without reaching the underlying
constitutional question.
Chief Justice Roberts elaborated on his approach to judging in a
Commencement address he delivered at Georgetown University Law
Center in 2006, as he approached the end of his first full Term on the
Court. There, he lauded the potential for greater agreement among the
Justices, which he said would make it “more likely [to be a]
decision . . . on the narrowest possible ground.” 51 He said further that
“[i]f it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, in my view it
48
49
50
51

Id. at 303.
Id.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
Georgetown Address, supra note 4.
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is necessary not to decide more.” 52 Chief Justice Roberts used the word
“narrowest” to describe the grounds for decision he favors and Professor
Sunstein has used this quote to support his case for the Chief Justice as a
proponent of narrow decisions. 53 While the quoted language is not
inconsistent with a commitment to narrowness, it more directly
describes a shallow approach to judging, one whose grounds for
decision are structured to achieve consensus.
This summary is not to say that Chief Justice Roberts is not
notionally committed to narrowness. It is to say, rather, that to the
degree one can identify a philosophical commitment within his public
pronouncements, it is a commitment to shallow adjudication.
B.

What Chief Justice Roberts Has Practiced

To assess the degree to which Chief Justice Roberts has espoused
minimalism in practice, this Section begins with what are arguably the
three most controversial decisions of the Chief Justice’s tenure: Citizens
United v. FEC, Shelby County v. Holder, and NFIB. It may be true that
hard cases make bad law, but that is indeed the reason to focus on them
in assessing a judge’s methodological commitments. All adjudicatory
approaches work well in easy cases 54—which is why such cases are
easy—but hard cases test a judge’s faithfulness and lay bare his or her
jurisprudential instincts. Hard constitutional cases are a valuable
proving ground for minimalists in particular, since the best normative
case for minimalism is that its strategy of merits avoidance
accommodates nonjudicial actors in just the kinds of difficult cases in
which their engagement is critical. 55
In each of these three cases, Chief Justice Roberts signed onto an
opinion that either invalidated or significantly altered a congressional
statute. But in each case, he also refused to proceed as aggressively as he
could have even though he likely had the votes to do so. This Section
discusses each case in turn before more briefly discussing other cases or
doctrinal areas in which Chief Justice Roberts’s narrow—but not always
shallow—approach is evident.

Id.
See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 362.
54 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1193 (1987) (“[W]ithin our legal culture, it is the rare
judicial opinion, the anomalous brief, the unusual scholarly analysis that describes the relevant
kinds of arguments as pointing in different directions.”).
55 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 5–6.
52
53
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Citizens United v. FEC

In Citizens United, the Court invalidated section 203 of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which restricted the use of a
corporation’s general treasury funds for independent electioneering
expenditures in the run-up to an election. 56 Writing for a 5-4 majority,
Justice Kennedy held that the First Amendment does not permit the
government to restrict speech on the basis of the corporate identity of
the speaker. 57 That holding overruled the Court’s prior decisions in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 58 and McConnell v. FEC. 59
Citizens United cannot be characterized as a deferential decision,
but Chief Justice Roberts’s approach to the issue of restrictions on
corporate electioneering has been substantially narrower than it could
have been. Citizens United was not the first time the Court had the
opportunity to address the applicability of campaign spending
restrictions to corporations. In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 60
decided in 2007, the question was whether federal restrictions on
express advocacy in the lead-up to an election could be applied to ads
that purported to be issue ads but were timed and structured to
influence an election. 61 Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion, joined in
full only by Justice Alito, that held that the ads at issue in the case
counted as constitutionally protected issue ads rather than express
advocacy and so could succeed in an as-applied challenge to BCRA
section 203. 62
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas,
concurred in the judgment only, writing that section 203 was
unconstitutional on its face. 63 In Justice Scalia’s view, virtually any
campaign ad would fail Chief Justice Roberts’s test for the
constitutionally permissible scope of section 203: being “susceptible of
no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate.” That being so, the Chief Justice’s opinion,
in effect, facially invalidated section 203 without saying so. 64 As Justice
Scalia wrote: “This faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.” 65
Justice Alito wrote a brief separate concurrence in which he suggested
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

2 U.S.C. § 441b, invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
494 U.S. 652 (1990).
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
551 U.S. 449 (2007).
See id. at 455–57.
See id. at 457.
See id. at 483–84 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See id. at 498 n.7.
Id.
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that it was unnecessary to declare the statute unconstitutional on its face
in light of the successful as applied challenge, but that a later Court
might need to consider a facial challenge should the existence of the
statute be found to chill political speech. 66
Given the vote lineup in that later case—Citizens United, which
included precisely the same majority as Wisconsin Right to Life—it
seems likely that, had Chief Justice Roberts wished to overrule Austin in
2007, he would have had four joins—and therefore a majority—for such
an opinion. That he chose not to do so reflects a preference for narrow
decisions that decide only the case before the Court. The Chief Justice’s
opinion in Wisconsin Right to Life indeed represents a commitment to
narrowness sufficient to overcome his announced preference for
consensus. Refusing to declare BCRA section 203 unconstitutional on
its face meant that Wisconsin Right to Life had no majority opinion.
Any assessment of the degree to which Citizens United is
minimalist must therefore confront the fact that the Court had already
issued a shot across the bow in Wisconsin Right to Life. There is plenty
of ammunition to argue that Citizens United is not a narrow opinion.
There were several off-ramps that could have awarded victory to the
petitioners without holding that section 203 was facially
unconstitutional. The communication at issue in Citizens United was a
video-on-demand film, written by a small nonprofit, that was critical of
Hillary Clinton, who was a candidate for the Democratic nomination
for president in 2008. 67 The Court could have held that the film was no
more “express advocacy” than was the ad at issue in Wisconsin Right to
Life. It could have held that as a nonprofit corporation financed largely
by individual donors, Citizens United could successfully raise an asapplied challenge to section 203. It could have held that video-ondemand, because it does not hold its audience captive, does not raise the
same concerns as television ads and therefore could support a successful
as applied challenge. The Court accelerated past every one of these
narrower alternative holdings. 68
Recall, however, that Justice Kennedy, not the Chief Justice, wrote
the majority opinion in Citizens United. In other major cases
invalidating or altering federal statutes, the Chief Justice has taken on
the writing assignment himself. 69 Jeffrey Toobin has written that this
smoke indicates a fire. On Toobin’s account, the Chief Justice in fact
initially wanted to resolve Citizens United on narrow statutory grounds
that acknowledged that a video-on-demand film by a small nonprofit
66
67
68
69

See id. at 482–83 (Alito, J., concurring).
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
See id. at 324–29.
See Shelby County. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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was not the natural target of BCRA. 70 He assigned himself an opinion so
holding, but Justice Kennedy circulated a draft concurrence arguing that
the Court should declare section 203 unconstitutional on its face. 71
According to Toobin, Justice Kennedy’s draft prompted Chief Justice
Roberts to withdraw his majority opinion. 72 Rather than issue the
Kennedy opinion, however—and with substantial pressure from Justice
Souter’s draft dissent—the Court agreed to set the case for a reargument
the following Term to air the constitutional questions directly. 73 After
reargument, Chief Justice Roberts assigned the opinion to Justice
Kennedy. 74
Toobin describes this sequence of events in Machiavellian terms,
but what it more likely indicates—if true—is that Chief Justice Roberts’s
instinct towards narrow adjudication remained intact in the lead-up to
Citizens United. The only way he could have persevered in his apparent
preference for a narrow resolution of the case would have been to issue
another splintered decision that, like Wisconsin Right to Life, lacked a
majority. Under the circumstances, and in light of Chief Justice
Roberts’s evident substantive view that section 203 was facially
unconstitutional, 75 one cannot fairly count Citizens United as evidence
that Chief Justice Roberts opportunistically avoids narrow decisions.
One can say, however, that Citizens United is deep rather than
shallow. The reason Congress may not regulate corporate electioneering
is not because freedom of speech in this case—or even in this and
similar cases—outweighs the government’s interest in preventing a
corporation from using its form to dominate political financing. It is
rather because, according to the Court, this “antidistortion” rationale
for campaign finance restrictions is not a legitimate governmental
interest at all. 76 As to the other significant potential rationale—the
politically destabilizing effect of the appearance of undue electoral
influence—Justice Kennedy further ventured into democratic theory,
writing without evidence that “[t]he appearance of influence or
access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.” 77
Citizens United was decided on the basis of deeply contested normative
and empirical premises that, if accepted, undermine not just section 203

70 See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME COURT
167 (2012).
71 See id.
72 See id. at 168.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 182.
75 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 376 (2010).
76 See id. at 349–50.
77 Id. at 360.
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of BCRA, but the very notion of restrictions on the financing of political
campaigns. This opinion is as deep as it gets.
2.

Shelby County v. Holder

The pattern evident in Citizens United—a narrow and seemingly
unnecessary shot across the bow preceding a deep and ideologically
conservative decision—repeated itself in Shelby County v. Holder. 78 At
issue was the statutory formula for determining which jurisdictions
were covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). 79
Section 5 subjects covered jurisdictions to the requirement that any
changes in their voting practices be precleared by the Department of
Justice or by a federal court in Washington, D.C. 80 Congress
reauthorized the Act in 2006 without altering the formula (found in
section 4(b) of the Act), even though that formula had been based on
racial disparities in voter registration and turnout from the 1972
presidential election.
The constitutional basis for section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is
section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which authorizes Congress to
enforce the Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination in voting “by
appropriate legislation.” 81 Up until the Shelby County decision, the
reigning framework for determining the reach for analogous
provisions—namely section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—was the
test first proposed in City of Boerne v. Flores 82: “There must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end.” 83
The case in which many observers expected the Court to invalidate
the VRA’s coverage formula was its 2009 decision in Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder (NAMUDNO). 84 There, a
utility district in Texas, a covered state, sought to establish its eligibility
for a “bailout” from the preclearance requirements of section 5 based on
its asserted history of nondiscrimination in voting. 85 The district court
had ruled that the statute contemplated bailout only for “a State or
political subdivision,” and that the utility district did not meet either

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
See id. at 2618–19.
52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012 & Supp. III 2016).
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id. at 520.
557 U.S. 193 (2009).
See id. at 196–97.
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definition. The district’s alternative argument was that the preclearance
requirements were unconstitutional. 86
Chief Justice Roberts wrote an opinion for eight members of the
Court that construed the statute as permitting bailout for the utility
district. The holding was explicitly grounded in constitutional
avoidance. The use of the avoidance canon in NAMUDNO was
aggressive. The Act defines a “political subdivision” as “any county or
parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under
the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other
subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.” 87 The
utility district was not a county or parish nor did it conduct voter
registration. The Court’s 1980 decision in City of Rome v. United States 88
had held that political subdivisions that were covered only because they
were part of a covered state were ineligible for bailout. 89 The
Department of Justice had issued regulations that indicated its view,
consistent with the text of the statute, that only political subdivisions
that register voters were eligible for bailout. 90 As Richard Hasen has
indicated, the NAMUDNO Court’s reading of the statute was considered
by many voting rights scholars to be “manifestly implausible.” 91
The NAMUDNO decision is both narrow and shallow. It is narrow
in that it decides the bailout eligibility of a single municipal utility
district without committing the Court to any other conclusions. It is
shallow in that, by relying on constitutional avoidance, the Court
permits constitutional concerns to motivate the particular decision
without requiring agreement on whether those concerns are
meaningful.
The public does not yet know what happened behind the scenes in
NAMUDNO. The best available evidence indicates that the Chief Justice
engaged his minimalist instincts by alerting Congress to a serious
constitutional concern before overruling its work. The Justices in the
Shelby County majority were all on the Court at the time of
NAMUDNO. Justice Kennedy, often considered the weak link of the
Roberts Court’s conservative bloc, asked questions at oral argument in
See id. at 200–01.
52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(2) (2012 & Supp. III 2016).
88 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
89 See id. at 167. In 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to make eligible for
bailout political subdivisions that had never been independently subject to the preclearance
coverage formula, but this amendment appears to apply only to units that meet the Act’s
definition of a “political subdivision.” See Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 131–32 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)(1)).
90 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.2, 51.5 (2015).
91 Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court,
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 182.
86
87
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NAMUDNO that forecast the ultimate holding in Shelby County. 92 As
with Wisconsin Right to Life and BCRA section 203, had the Chief
Justice wanted to invalidate or neutralize section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act in 2009, it is likely that he would have had the votes to do so.
In Shelby County, the Court held that the coverage formula in
section 4(b) of the Act is unconstitutional because it violates “the
fundamental principle of equal [state] sovereignty” without a sufficient
showing that its distinctions between states are related to the underlying
Fifteenth Amendment problem. 93 Shelby County is arguably a narrow
opinion, but it is not shallow. It is arguably narrow because it did not
invalidate section 5’s preclearance requirements, as many observers
assumed it would; it only invalidated the coverage formula, which
Congress is theoretically free to amend in whatever way it sees fit. 94 That
amendment, were it forthcoming, would likely prompt a new round of
litigation about the new formula, and a new Court decision. This backand-forth between Congress and the Court would be just the kind of
dialogue a narrow decision is designed to promote. 95 Had the Court
instead invalidated section 5, it would have foreclosed entirely the most
successful federal remedial scheme in the Nation’s history. 96
92 Justice Kennedy said to Neal Katyal, who as Acting Solicitor General argued the case on
behalf of the government:

Congress has made a finding that the sovereignty of Georgia is less than the
sovereign dignity of Ohio. The sovereignty of Alabama, is less than the sovereign
dignity of Michigan. And the governments in one are to be trusted less than the
governments than the other. . . . [T]his is a great disparity in treatment, and the
government of the United States is saying that our States must be treated differently.
And you have a very substantial burden if you’re going to make that case.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–35, NAMUNDO, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (No. 08-322).
93 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622, 2631 (2013).
94 See id. at 2631.
95 Some critics of the Shelby County decision have noted that the Chief Justice was surely
aware that a Republican-led Congress in a polarized era of legislative inertia was not going to
amend the Act’s coverage formula, and so the Court’s decision in effect invalidated section 5.
See, e.g., M. Akram Faizer, Reinforced Polarization: How the Roberts Court’s Recent Decision to
Invalidate the Voting Rights Act’s Coverage Formula Will Exacerbate the Divisions That Bedevil
U.S. Society, 45 CUMB. L. REV. 303, 346 (2014–15); Joel Heller, Shelby County and the End of
History, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 357, 404–05 (2013). But for the Court to leave in place what it
believes to be an irrational statute based on its prediction that Congress is unlikely to replace it
would have been an even more aggressive posture than the one the majority actually took.
Justice Thomas concurred on the ground that the Court should have invalidated section 5, and
so that disposition was plainly on the table. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
96 The decision is only arguably narrow because, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissenting
opinion, the Court permitted a facial challenge to section 5 by a litigant—Shelby County,
Alabama—that could easily have been named as a covered jurisdiction under an acceptable
coverage formula. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2645–48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Although
entertaining an as-applied challenge is ordinarily the more judicious course, which jurisdictions
may be covered under a constitutionally acceptable formula is a relative assessment that
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Shelby County is not, however, a shallow opinion. It relies on an
untested, controversial, and potentially quite broad theory of “equal
state sovereignty” that had never been the basis for a decision of the
Court. 97 As Justice Ginsburg wrote in her dissent, the Court’s reliance
on that principle as a burden-shifting device “is capable of much
mischief,” insofar as “[f]ederal statutes that treat States disparately are
hardly novelties.”98 The shallower approach would have been to treat
the case as an ordinary application of the congruence and
proportionality test, which was well-established by the time the Court
heard Shelby County. The road the Court took instead was far more
generative.
3.

NFIB v. Sebelius

The question in NFIB was whether Congress had the constitutional
power to require Americans to purchase health insurance. 99 The Court
held, per Chief Justice Roberts, that while Congress could not “require”
Americans to purchase health insurance, the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) is susceptible to an interpretation that renders the regulatory
scheme a tax that merely encourages the purchase of such insurance. 100
The Court has long endorsed Congress’s use of federal taxes to
encourage behavior by private persons or states. 101 The Court also held
that Congress had overreached in its use of its spending power (whose
source in Article I section 8 is the same as its taxing power) to encourage
states to expand their Medicaid coverage in line with federal
benchmarks. 102
Although there is much to criticize in NFIB, it is a narrow opinion
par excellence. Chief Justice Roberts manifestly had the votes to
invalidate the ACA in its entirety and he declined to do so. Moreover,
the Chief Justice’s opinion strains visibly to avoid making new
requires the drawing of a hypothetical statute. Whatever one thinks of the merits of the Court’s
pursuing this course of action—and I myself am sympathetic to it—doing so would have been
strikingly immodest.
97 See id. at 2648–49; Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State
Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 24 (2013). But see Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of the Equal
Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087 (2016) (arguing that the equal sovereignty principle
has deeper pedigree than the Shelby County opinion articulated).
98 Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012).
100 See id. at 2593–94.
101 See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (“[I]t has long been established
that an Act of Congress which on its face purports to be an exercise of the taxing power is not
any the less so because the tax is burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed.”).
102 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606–07.
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constitutional law. Understanding how that can be so in an opinion that
includes as many as four unprecedented constitutional law holdings
requires some additional discussion of the opinion’s relationship to
then-existing congressional power doctrine.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that neither Congress’s Commerce
Clause power nor its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause
permits it to require Americans to regulate “inactivity.” 103 Until NFIB,
there was no precedent for the proposition that the Commerce Clause
may not be used to regulate inactivity that substantially affects
commerce. But the ACA’s structure was unusual. Rather than guarantee
insurance coverage directly by enrolling Americans in a governmentcreated health insurance plan, Congress chose largely to retain the
existing private insurance infrastructure and require Americans to
contract into it. 104 This degree of federal intrusion into the private
economic decisions of most of the population was at least unusual.
When it comes to Commerce Clause doctrine, novelty matters. In
United States v. Lopez, the Court invalidated a congressional statute that
prohibited the possession of a handgun within the vicinity of a school. 105
As Justice Breyer demonstrated in his dissenting opinion, it is easy to
articulate ways in which the presence of dangerous weapons in and near
schools can affect interstate commerce. The key to the majority opinion
was that Congress’s exercise of its regulatory authority must leave in
place a remainder of activity subject only to state and local regulation (if
any). The Court’s response to each of the government’s theories of the
relationship between gun possession near schools and interstate
commerce was that the same theory would imply no limitation on
which activities the government could regulate. 106 As Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the Court, “Under the theories that the
Government presents . . . it is difficult to perceive any limitation on
federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or
education where States historically have been sovereign.” 107 Where once
the Court identified this injunction with the text of the Tenth
103 See id. at 2592–93. None of Chief Justice Roberts’s colleagues joined this part of his
opinion, even though it is consistent with the joint dissent of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito. See id. at 2644–46 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., Alito, J., dissenting). Reporting
on the case has suggested that these dissenters refused to join any part of the Chief Justice’s
opinion out of anger over his reportedly switching his vote in the case. See Jan Crawford,
Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 2, 2012, 9:43 PM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/roberts-switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law
(This
Article
makes no assumptions about the accuracy of this reporting except to note that the dissenters’
refusal to join is puzzling on its face.).
104 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580.
105 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
106 See id. at 564.
107 Id.
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Amendment, 108 it is now fair to call it a structural inference that
operates as a background constraint on the federal regulatory state. 109
In Commerce Clause cases, then, precedent requires the
government to grapple with the presence or absence of a federalism
remainder. This is why the question of whether Congress hypothetically
could regulate consumption of vegetables, raised before the case was
heard, at oral argument, and in several opinions, 110 was so devastating.
The hypothetical was doctrinally, and not just rhetorically, significant.
Although there is no similar case directly requiring such a remainder
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, any regulation of activity on the
ground that it substantially affects interstate commerce may be
recharacterized as a regulation of the same activity on the ground that
doing so is a necessary and proper means of regulating interstate
commerce directly. 111
The relative novelty of requiring individuals to engage in market
activity opened the government to the doctrinally supported demand
for an articulable limit that contemplates a sphere of life that the federal
government may not touch. The government’s, and the dissent’s,
response to that demand was inadequate, no doubt in part because none
of the dissenters has ever embraced that aspect of Commerce Clause
doctrine. 112 This discussion means only to suggest that invalidating the
ACA was a doctrinally available outcome—the opinion writes—whether
or not it would have been the best or most defensible outcome. 113
Now consider that Chief Justice Roberts evidently believed not
only that the absence of a federalism remainder was dispositive of the
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause arguments, but
also that the best reading of the statute was that it imposed a “penalty”
rather than a “tax.” 114 And consider that it is beyond any real doubt that
he had the votes to strike the law down in its entirety. To rely on

108 See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
109 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (reaffirming the necessity of
placing articulable limits on the reach of the Commerce Clause).
110 See Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and
Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66, 69–70 (2013).
111 Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (affirming Congress’s power to regulate
home-grown marijuana under both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause).
112 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 609 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 639
(Souter, J., dissenting).
113 Indeed, my own view is that striking down the individual mandate underestimates the
role health insurance plays in the national economy. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2609–10 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
114 See id. at 2593–94, 2600 (Roberts, C.J.).
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constitutional avoidance to nonetheless uphold the law is almost
pathologically narrow.
Notably, existing Taxing Power doctrine looked very different from
existing Commerce Clause doctrine at the time NFIB was decided. Lopez
and United States v. Morrison, which held that a federal civil remedy for
victims of domestic abuse exceeded the federal government’s Commerce
Clause power, 115 had each been decided in the seventeen years leading
up to NFIB. By contrast, the Court had not held that an exercise of the
Taxing Power was unduly coercive or punitive and, therefore, an
impermissible penalty, since the Lochner Era. 116 Chief Justice Roberts
issued shots across the bow in Wisconsin Right to Life and in
NAMUDNO that alerted Congress and the public to the Court’s
conservative instincts. Lopez and Morrison were the analogs in the
Commerce Clause area. There was no equivalent with respect to the
Taxing Power. Indeed, the joint dissent did not contest that the Taxing
Power would give Congress the authority to enact the ACA if the
individual mandate took the form of a tax.
It is fair to wonder whether the Chief Justice’s opinion in NFIB
may be called narrow in light of the fact that the elaborate Commerce
Clause “holding” might be dicta. If the ACA’s individual mandate is an
acceptable exercise of federal taxing power, then it was “not necessary to
decide more.”117 Note, though, that Chief Justice Roberts did not
commit himself to the view that the mandate was an acceptable exercise
of the Taxing Power. Indeed, he wrote that “[t]he most straightforward
reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase
insurance.” 118 Brushing that command to the side required the Chief
Justice to invoke a version of the avoidance canon. It is only a version of
the canon because, on another reading of constitutional avoidance—
sometimes called “modern avoidance”—its purpose is to obviate the
need for precisely the constitutional analysis Chief Justice Roberts
nevertheless indulged. 119 Choosing a more aggressive form of
constitutional avoidance does not much undermine narrowness,
however, since he still upheld the law. Indeed, this approach might serve
narrowness in that Chief Justice Roberts upheld a law on avoidance
grounds even after determining that it was otherwise unconstitutional.

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20 (1922).
117 See Georgetown Address, supra note 4.
118 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593 (emphasis added).
119 See Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme
Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2116–17 (2015).
115
116
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Narrowness does not mean abandoning one’s substantive views; it
means declining to act upon those views unless and until necessary. 120
Even though Chief Justice Roberts’s brand of avoidance in NFIB is
consistent with narrowness, it does reflect a penchant for deep rather
than shallow constitutional adjudication. Conducting avoidance in the
way he did required him to write a solo opinion articulating an
unprecedented theory of the reach of the Commerce Clause.
His opinion eliminating certain conditions on the ACA’s
inducement of an expansion of Medicaid coverage was also both narrow
and deep. The Court held that, because the cost of refusing to expand
Medicaid was the possibility that the Administration might withhold all
existing Medicaid funds, states had no practical choice but to accede to
the expanded coverage. 121 Based on prior cases, the federal government
does not have the authority to commandeer a state’s executive or
legislative apparatus to implement a federal program. 122 The ACA case
represents the first time the Court had ever held that an exercise of
Congress’s spending power was unconstitutionally coercive. 123
Still, the Court had previously held that coercion was a kind of
omnibus prong of the relevant doctrinal test, 124 and here Chief Justice
Roberts relied on facts unique to Medicaid in holding that the ACA
crossed the line. Most significantly, federal Medicaid funding amounts
to between ten and twenty percent of the average state’s total budget,
which is true of no other federal funding program. 125 The fact that this
decision was susceptible to being read as good-for-this-case-only seems
likely to have influenced the decision of two more liberal Justices, Justice
Breyer and Justice Kagan, to join the Chief Justice’s opinion.
It is also worth noting that Chief Justice Roberts was almost
certainly correct that the threat of withdrawal of existing Medicaid
funding would have been a but-for cause of many states’ participation in
the Medicaid expansion. As of this writing, nineteen states have refused
to expand Medicaid in the way the ACA contemplates. 126 It is unlikely
that the number would be nearly that high—or even non-zero—if the
cost of non-compliance was a withdrawal of existing federal Medicaid
120 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 375 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“It
should go without saying, however, that we cannot embrace a narrow ground of decision
simply because it is narrow; it must also be right.”).
121 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05.
122 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 188 (1992).
123 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
124 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
125 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05; id. at 2662–63 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
126 Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(Oct. 14, 2016), http://kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-the-medicaid-expansiondecision.
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funding. To take just one typical example, Georgia, which has to date
opted not to expand Medicaid, froze its existing expansion plan
immediately when the Court issued its decision. 127 In the face of fairly
demonstrable degrees of federal coercion, the decision to uphold the
ACA in its enacted form would be a decision to ignore that coercion.
That position would be a perfectly respectable one for a champion of the
federal regulatory state to adopt, but it is also reasonable for a regulatory
skeptic or a federalism proponent to take the opposite view.
Chief Justice Roberts’s NFIB Medicaid opinion was deep rather
than shallow, however. The fact that only two of his colleagues joined
the opinion is some evidence of that depth. 128 So, too, is the Chief
Justice’s reliance on the absence of a meaningful choice—rather than a
more specific doctrinal test—as a touchstone of a Spending Clause
violation. The leading Spending Clause case prior to this one was South
Dakota v. Dole, 129 in which the Court applied a multifactor test to
uphold a federal program that denied highway funds to states with a
drinking age under twenty-one. 130 Under Dole, a valid exercise of the
Spending Power must be in pursuit of the general welfare, its conditions
must be unambiguous, the conditions must be related to the federal
interest in particular national projects, and the funding conditions must
not violate an independent constitutional provision. 131 The Dole test
provides the Court with multiple avenues through which it may
invalidate a statute as exceeding the powers granted under the Spending
Clause. Chief Justice Roberts did not recite the Dole test in his opinion,
relying instead solely on an assessment of whether the federal law is
coercive. In order to achieve consensus, this approach requires
agreement on a single, vague, and highly normatively charged standard.
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion deepened the Spending Clause test.

127

A1.

See Misty Williams, Medicaid Overhaul Postponed, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 14, 2012, at

128 As noted above, the reason Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito did not join
portions of the Chief Justice’s opinion that they appeared to agree with is not transparent. See
supra note 103.
129 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
130 See id. at 207–08.
131 See id.
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Other Examples

Many other examples suggest Chief Justice Roberts’s
maximinimalism, his commitment to narrow but deep decision-making
strategies.
For example, in another controversial opinion, Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 132 he wrote a
plurality opinion that labeled two public school districts’ race-conscious
integration plans as impermissible “racial balancing.” 133 Parents
Involved is obviously deep rather than shallow: Chief Justice Roberts’s
denunciation of race-conscious school assignment plans as “patently
unconstitutional” 134 threatened to neuter the ability of local
governments to remedy racial segregation in schools. The Chief Justice’s
commitment to this restricted view of government power in this domain
was so strong that he declined to alter his opinion sufficiently to obtain
Justice Kennedy’s vote and thereby create an opinion of the Court. 135
Still, it is easy to overlook that, for all its polemics, Chief Justice
Roberts’s Parents Involved opinion sought to distinguish rather than
overrule the Court’s opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 136 which upheld the
race-based affirmative action plan of the University of Michigan Law
School. 137 An individual judge who departs from precedent without
feeling the need to formally overrule it is pursuing a narrow path. 138
More broadly, Chief Justice Roberts is attracted to a number of
doctrinal areas that speak to his narrowness. For example, a narrow
judge has a relative preference for delaying merits adjudication of
constitutional questions. To wit, other than summary reversals, Chief
Justice Roberts has never authored or joined a Supreme Court opinion
that argued that the state court judgment in a case governed by the
habeas provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law. He has also never authored or joined an opinion
denying qualified immunity to a state officer accused of a constitutional
violation. Indeed, along with all of his colleagues, he joined Justice
Alito’s 2009 opinion in Pearson v. Callahan holding that a federal court,
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
Id. at 729–30.
134 Id. at 730 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)).
135 See id. at 787–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
136 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
137 See id. at 343.
138 Consider also Chief Justice Roberts’s self-consciously fact-sensitive opinion upholding
the right of members of the Westboro Baptist Church to picket on a public sidewalk near the
funeral of a U.S. soldier killed in action. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011) (“Our
holding today is narrow.”).
132
133
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including the Supreme Court, was not obligated to reach the merits of
the underlying constitutional question once it decides that qualified
immunity attaches. 139 The natural effect of Pearson will be to retard the
development of substantive constitutional doctrine.
This Article’s characterization of Chief Justice Roberts as narrow
and deep is a general one, and it admits of exceptions. To take one
example, the Chief Justice’s opinion in McCullen v. Coakley held that
Massachusetts’s law creating a buffer zone around abortion clinics need
not be analyzed under strict scrutiny (because it was content-neutral)
but nonetheless failed constitutional scrutiny because it was not
narrowly tailored. 140 This holding was both narrow—it focused intently
on the facts of the particular Massachusetts law—and shallow—it did
not rely upon a broad First Amendment theory and managed to reach a
result that garnered the support of all nine Justices.
Another counterexample is Graham v. Florida, 141 the 2010 opinion
holding that juveniles who were not convicted of a homicide are
categorically ineligible for a mandatory sentence of life without
parole. 142 Chief Justice Roberts wrote a concurring opinion in which he
argued that eligibility for mandatory life without parole should be
decided on a case-by-case basis but agreed that the petitioner should not
receive such a sentence. 143 Had the Chief Justice’s opinion been a
holding of the Court, it would have been both narrow and shallow.
More generally, the October 2015 Court Term, which was
bifurcated by Justice Scalia’s death, presented numerous opportunities
for narrow and shallow opinions, which the Roberts Court often
exploited. In Zubik v. Burwell, 144 the Court disposed of a controversial
case involving the procedure by which the federal government exempts
religious employers from the ACA birth control mandate by ordering
the parties to settle on terms the Court itself devised. 145 In Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 146 the Court sidestepped an important question of Congress’s
capacity to found Article III standing on a violation of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act and simply remanded the case back to the Court of
Appeals for a second look. 147 In United States v. Texas, 148 the Court
divided 4-4 and, therefore, it affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–38 (2009).
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534, 2537 (2014).
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
See id. at 74.
See id. at 86 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
See id. at 1559–60.
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
See id. at 1544–45.
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
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enjoining the Administration’s deferred immigration enforcement
program. 149 Per custom, the Court issued no opinion in support of its
affirmance by an equally divided Court, thereby effecting a decision that
was both narrow—it created no precedent outside of the Fifth Circuit—
and shallow—the Justices’ substantive views were entirely obscure.
We might have to wait many decades before we know Chief Justice
Roberts’s role in these dispositions. What we do know is that in the
most significant cases of his tenure, he has consistently proceeded both
narrowly and deeply. Narrowness is in line with his public comments
about his judicial philosophy, but depth is not. The next Part offers a
normative assessment, and qualified defense, of a Supreme Court
Justice’s marrying of narrowness to depth.
III. ASSESSMENT
This Part offers a tentative, and generally positive, assessment of
the Chief Justice’s lived preference for narrowness and depth in
important and controversial constitutional cases. In brief, the
combination of narrowness and depth—maximinimalism—is consistent
with a dialogic approach to constitutional law that appropriately softens
the strongest form of judicial review but does so without abandoning an
equally appropriate commitment to judicial transparency. Whether or
not Chief Justice Roberts has succeeded in striking the right notes in the
cases discussed, the aspiration towards narrowness and depth, while not
without flaws, has much to commend it.
Framing this assessment requires some clarification of its
normative criteria. Many of the Chief Justice’s detractors are likely to
dispute this Article’s characterization of Citizen’s United, Shelby County,
or NFIB as narrow opinions. Some are likely to view lack of deference to
Congress’s considered judgment as necessarily broad.150 Others are
likely to view Chief Justice Roberts’s positions in these cases as
substantively unreasonable and therefore as evidence of his bad faith. 151
The response to both of these objections is about the same. For
minimalism to qualify as something other than judicial abdication or ad
hoc adjudication, it must guide and qualify some set of substantive
commitments. This Article assumes that the rule of law under a system
See id. at 2272; Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015).
See, e.g., Diane S. Sykes, Lecture, Minimalism and Its Limits, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 17,
33 (referring to Citizens United as “decidedly nonminimalist”).
151 See generally David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 889
(2016) (identifying varieties of bad-faith constitutional interpretation and diagnosing the
absence of a discourse of bad faith in constitutional doctrine).
149
150
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of judicial review occasionally requires courts to invalidate acts of
Congress. It also assumes that in deeply contested constitutional cases,
there typically exist reasonable, lawyerly arguments that support a range
of ideological commitments and case outcomes. In my view, each of the
cases discussed in this Article fit that pattern; those who disagree can
assume arguendo for the purposes of this Part that good-faith legal
arguments exist in support of the Chief Justice’s positions.
Minimalism is not about not having views of the law or not
pushing it in one’s desired direction when the law is uncertain. It is
about doing that pushing incrementally. Narrow opinions move the law
gradually rather than all at once. The significant downside of
narrowness is lack of legal clarity and predictability. But this downside is
most salient in private and administrative law, where legal uncertainty
can prevent coordination and planning and can upset investmentbacked expectations. In cases in which constitutional or other public
rights are at issue, by contrast, legal uncertainty can turn from vice to
virtue. In such cases, the Constitution itself is typically unclear, leaving
citizen movements and organized interest groups to vie for the law’s ear.
Allowing this process to play out for longer rather than cutting it off
through what Robert Cover called “jurispathic” court decisions can
serve the values of a pluralistic, participatory democracy. 152
Narrow decisions leave open just this kind of deliberative space. In
the years that follow a narrow shot across the bow such as Wisconsin
Right to Life or NAMUDNO, Congress, states, or localities can change
the law either to conform, respond to, or challenge the Court’s decision;
members of the general public or the media can criticize the Court and
influence the politics of the nomination process; 153 and individual
Justices can retire, pass away, or change their views in response to public
discourse. 154 The lived experience of constitutional law is the evolution
152 Robert M. Cover, Foreword, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983); see
also SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 54 (arguing that minimalism “allows democratic processes
room to maneuver”); id. at 59 (“The case for minimalism is especially strong when the area
involves a highly contentious question now receiving sustained democratic attention.”).
153 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1066–78 (2001) (discussing the prospect of gradual constitutional change
through capture of the nomination process by political partisans).
154 Consider, for example, the narrow decision in Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014),
which held that the First Amendment prohibits a public sector union from collecting agency
fees from home health care workers, who are quasi-private sector employees and who do not
enjoy the same benefits from collective bargaining as many other workers. See id. at 2638, 2644.
It seems probable that the votes existed on the Harris Court to rule more broadly by overruling
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), which permits such fees and which
Justice Alito’s majority opinion heavily criticized. See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2652–53 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“Readers of today’s decision will know that Abood does not rank on the majority’s
top-ten list of favorite precedents—and that the majority could not restrain itself from saying
(and saying and saying) so.”). In the 2015 Term, prior to Justice Scalia’s death, the Court again
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of what Robert Post calls the “constitutional culture.” 155 Narrowness
gives that culture breathing room.
But there is a problem with combining narrowness with
shallowness, as Sunstein generally urges. The benefit of narrowness is
that it tees up an issue for additional public deliberation without actually
deciding it. But effective teeing up of constitutional issues requires a
measure of transparency about the Court’s disposition and intentions.
Inasmuch as shallow decisions obscure the basis for the Court’s
decisions, they undermine the deliberative advantages, such as they are,
of proceeding narrowly. Individual Justices and the Court itself enable
public accountability by supplying reasons for their decisions. As Bickel
emphasized, offering principled reasons for their decisions differentiates
judges from other political actors who have the discretion to act
expediently. 156
Consider, then, the situation after Wisconsin Right to Life, after
NAMUDNO, and after NFIB. The Court had not, respectively, struck
down BCRA section 203, any part of the Voting Rights Act, or—in the
main—the Affordable Care Act. At the same time, it had alerted
Congress and the American public of its distaste for each of these laws
and the constitutional theories that supported them. There was no real
mystery as to what the Court would do with the next similar case, and
yet the Court had not meaningfully acted. This maximinimalist posture
has obvious advantages over a Court that implements its ideological
agenda either immediately and without pretense or incrementally but
obscurely.
What this posture calls to mind is a relatively strong version of
weak-form judicial review. Weak-form review describes a range of
approaches of courts around the world that lie between the poles of
legislative and judicial supremacy. A weak-form model encourages
dialogue between political and judicial institutions. For example,
Stephen Gardbaum has identified what he describes as the “new
commonwealth model,” common to Canada, the United Kingdom, and
New Zealand, where under courts are empowered to engage in review
under a bill of rights but the legislature is formally given the last word in
response to a declaration of unconstitutionality or incompatibility with

heard oral argument over whether Abood should be overruled. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 14–915). Justice Scalia
died before an opinion could issue, and the Court divided 4-4, thereby failing to produce a
binding legal precedent. See Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. at 1083. This sequence of events illustrates
both the risk and the opportunity inherent in a narrow approach to constitutional adjudication.
155 Robert C. Post, Foreword, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law,
117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003).
156 BICKEL, supra note 17, at 69.
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established law. 157 In Germany, where the Constitutional Court has the
final word, the Court has nonetheless been known to sever its opinion
from its mandate to give additional time for the political branches to
respond to a declaration of unconstitutionality. 158 This approach reflects
a degree of respect for the constitutional capacity of the political
branches and social movements in the context of highly charged
constitutional controversies.
CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Roberts arrived at the Court espousing a shallow, and
perhaps narrow, approach to adjudication. In significant constitutional
cases, his approach has instead been narrow and deep, what this Article
calls maximinimalism. Sunstein describes this combination as rare. “[A]
deep account will in all likelihood have applications to cases other than
the one before the Court,” he writes. “Ambitious reasoning typically
produces width.” 159
In being atypical, Chief Justice Roberts lights the way to an
intriguing jurisprudence, one that engages nonjudicial actors to
participate in constitutional law without abdicating judicial supremacy.
Maximinimalism exposes the Court’s ideological seams but preserves
the option of pivoting, drawing back, or accelerating in a later case.
With Chief Justice Roberts, we have gotten what we have seen. Just not
right away.

157 See STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2013).
158 See Susanne Baer, Equality: The Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court, 5
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 274 (1999).
159 SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 18.

